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Lockheed Aircraft Corporation emerged from World War II a financial-
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In May 1971 legislation to be known as the Emergency Loan Guarantee
Act was introduced before Congress. Although the avowed purpose of this
legislation was to provide Federal guarantees for loans to major United
States corporations having serious financial difficulties, it was widely
believed to be specifically aimed toward rescuing the nation's number
one defense contractor, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, from bankruptcy.
The operations of Lockheed over the preceding two decades provide an
abundance of material which traces the decline of this giant aerospace
corporation from the position of an industry leader in the early fifties
to near bankruptcy in the seventies.
This thesis consists of a series of case studies, centered around
Lockheed's most recent entry into the commercial transport field, the
L-1011, which cases outline Lockheed's financial decline from 1952 to
1971. These cases are a result of an interest by Professor Leslie Darby-
shire in developing materials for use in the Financial Management courses
at the Naval Postgraduate School. Having chosen Lockheed Aircraft Cor-
poration as his subject, Professor Darbyshire spent several months on
library research compiling as much data from readily available published
sources as possible on the operations of Lockheed since 1957. In Dec-
ember 1973, the author accepted Professor Darbyshire's offer to sponsor
development of the Lockheed cases as a thesis project. Additional li-
brary research was conducted to extend coverage of the material back
through 1954, fill in pertinent material not previously collected, and
provide supplementary information on events which, although external to
Lockheed, impacted upon Lockheed's operations.

All information contained in these cases was obtained from sources
previously published. Specific references to footnotes have been elim-
inated to facilitate classroom use of the cases. Since the source in-
formation for these cases was taken from publicly available material,
some bias may exist in its presentation and management personnel at
Lockheed, both past and present, may raise objection to some of the
views presented. However, information in the public domain is generally
the only source by which the average citizen may judge a public corporation.

II. LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION
A. L-1011 CASE A
The advent of the jet airliner in the late 1950s ushered in a period
of explosive expansion for the commercial airline industry. As comfort
increased and travel times were halved, more people began to turn to the
airlines as a prime mode of travel. Domestic passenger traffic increased
at a rate of approximately 15% per year, and international U. S. passen-
ger traffic averaged more than a 30% yearly increase during the period
from 1963 to 1966. For a while the airlines were able to handle these
traffic increases by simply adding more flights, but this action was
only a temporary solution and caused overall load factors for U.S. car-
riers to remain virtually unchanged. By late 1965, officials were be-
coming concerned that aircraft and passenger traffic congestion at major
airports would saturate their capability to handle projected traffic
loads. Additionally, medium range routes, such as New York to Chicago,
began to develop. These routes called for aircraft with a seating ca-
pacity equal to or greater than that of the large transcontinental jets
but which would be more economical to operate. Europe was becoming
especially aware of the need for such an aircraft, and proposals for a
European "airbus" were emerging from their airframe manufacturers.
In March 1966, American Airlines issued a preliminary specification
sheet to major U. S. airframe manufacturers. These specifications out-
lined American's requirements for a twin engine jumbo passenger trans-
port. American was interested in an aircraft having a 480 knot speed, a
minimum range of 1850 nautical miles, and seating capacity for at least
250 passengers. This event marked the beginning of a hotly contested
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and controversial race among major airframe manufacturers to capture the
"airbus" market which, by various estimates, held a potential for sales
of 400 to 450 aircraft over the next decade.
B. LOCKHEED 1952-1960
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation entered the decade of the fifties in
a strong commercial position on the wings of the highly successful Con-
stellation (a transcontinental transport powered by four conventional
piston engines). A total of 216 Constellations had been delivered to
customers by 1952, and future deliveries were expected eventually to
exceed 500 units over the next eight to ten years. The year 1954
proved to be very eventful for airframe manufacturers and marked the be-
ginning of the jet age for U.S. air carriers. In June, American Air-
lines President, William Littlewood, turned the major manufacturers'
attention to a new area by citing the need for an efficient short-haul
aircraft to service routes of under 1000 miles. After much success de-
veloping a turboprop heavy-lift transport (C-130 Hercules) for the Air
Force, Lockheed announced what would subsequently prove to be a short-
lived sales effort to provide commercial air carriers with a fast (440
knot) heavy-lift transport by modifying the Constellation with turboprop
engines. In the same time frame, Douglas Aircraft Corporation announced
its entry into the jet market by unveiling plans for a turbojet tanker/
transport designed as direct competition for the Boeing 707 turbojet,
which was already marked for heavy sales to the Air Force as the KC-135.
Shortly after the Douglas announcement, Boeing revealed plans to start
promoting the 707 as a commercial transport. Rounding out the year,
Lockheed Vice President for Engineering, H. L. Hibbard, hinted at that
company's furure direction when, taking public notice of a British entry

in the jet race — the Vickers Viscount medium range turboprop - he pre-
dicted a potential market of up to 500 aircraft to meet the future needs
for short- to-medium range routes.
With the stage thus set, American Airlines again took the initiative
in May 1955 by issuing detailed specifications to the major airframe
manufacturers for a 400-knot, 60-passenger, 2000-mile range transport
which could be in service by late 1958. Lockheed, having just dropped
plans for the turboprop Constallation, responded with specifications for
what was to become the Electra. In June, American chose the Lockheed
design and placed an order for 35 Electras. It appeared that Lockheed
had captured another successful hold on the commercial market and that
separate, distince markets were developing for medium range and trans-
continental aircraft. By deciding to pursue development of a turboprop
transport in the face of the emerging turbojet technology, Lockheed had
expressed confidence that development of a pure jet aircraft which could
efficiently compete with the Electra on short-to-medium range routes was
not probable in the foreseeable future. Indeed, in August 1955, Robert
Gross, Lockheed President, felt that demand for the Electra would exceed
that of any four-engine transport yet produced. While not questioning
the inevitability of pure jets, he stated a belief that the present mar-
ket was more limited than the market for the Electra but promised that
Lockheed would be ready with a jet entry "when we feel the market is
ready and the timing is right."
As 1955 drew to a close, the turbine powered aircraft came of age as
Pan American, Eastern, American, and Braniff signed orders for a total of
55 Boeing 707's, 25 Douglas DC-8s, and 49 Electras. These orders seemed
to confirm the Lockheed projections and prompted more official company
predictions of a vast market for the Electra. The first hint of a
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potential intruder into this market came with the April 1956 announcement
by Convair of the design for a 60-passenger turbojet aircraft which could
not only compete with the Electra on short-to-medium range routes, but
would also have a transcontinental range, as compared to the Electra's
1850 mile limit. The aircraft, later designated the Convair 880, was to
be available by January 1960 - only one year after the Electra's first
scheduled delivery date. This announcement caught the attention of air-
lines not already committed to the Electra, since the new 880 would
essentially be available to them at the same time as the Electra. If
the Convair announcement alone was not enough to worry the Lockheed man-
agement, both Boeing and Douglas soon followed with plans for similar
aircraft. This competition forced redesign efforts on the Electra to
extend the aircraft's range and payload. The resulting effect on per-







Cruise Speed (Knots) 400 354
Range (Miles) 1850-2000 2740
Wingspan (Feet) 95 99
Length (Feet) 101 104
Gross Takeoff Weight (Pounds) 98,500 113,000
Seemingly undeterred by the Convair competition to the Electra, Lock-
heed also found an opportunity to get into the pure jet market in August
1956, when the Air Force circulated a requirement throughout the industry
for a small twin- jet utility transport and indicated a probable total
military sales package of over 1500 aircraft. Lockheed assigned the
project to C. L. "Kelly" Johnson, Vice President for Engineering. Within
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two hundred forty-one days, Lockheed rolled out the first prototype
of the JetStar for testing by the Air Force. Since the aircraft was de-
signed to meet Civil Aeronautics Administration requirements and to be
easily produced in either two or four-engine versions, Lockheed hoped
not only to capture the Air Force contract but also to corner the market
for a small, high-speed business jet. Throughout 1958 and 1959, Lock-
heed worked on developing the commercial market for the JetStar, pending
an Air Force decision to buy the aircraft in quantity. The company was
so confident of the JetStar's success that it listed nearly $31 million
in development costs as deferred assets on its 1959 financial statements,
under the assumption that government reimbursement would come with the
first Air Force orders.
Optimism at Lockheed began to dim when the initial rush by commercial
carriers to buy the new Electra slowed as pure jets began to dominate the
sales picture. By the time the first Electra was delivered in January
1959, orders for the big transcontinental jets numbered 215, while the
smaller jets had spurred orders for 86 aircraft and Electra orders stood
at 126. With the airlines already turning to the pure jets, the Electra
encountered a series of setbacks that doomed it to commercial failure.
In August 1959, several Electras developed cracks in the wing surfaces
which required redesign and repair efforts. Then, in September 1959,
and again in March 1960, an Electra was the victim of an in-flight dis-
integration. After the 1960 disaster, the FAA imposed strict operating
restrictions on all Electras then in service and Lockheed began an ex-
tensive investigation and defect repair effort that would eventually
cost the company more than $25 million. The program never recovered
from these setbacks. At the same time, White House pressure diverted
military emphasis from manned aircraft to satellites and missiles, and
12

the expected large JetStar order failed to materialize. The Air Force
ordered only five JetStars and civilian interest generated only twenty-
one additional orders. In August 1960, Lockheed President Gross sounded
the final notes of the Electra and JetStar ventures as failures. He
described the projects as a drain on profits due to lower-than-expected
sales and announced that total write-offs for the 1959-1960 period would
exceed $100 million.
C. LOCKHEED 1961-1966
The year 1961 was a critical one at Lockheed and appeared to mark
the beginning of a period of recovery for the company. Courtlandt Gross
had become Board Chairman upon the death of his brother, Robert, early
in the year. Then, after absorbing the Electra and JetStar losses, Lock-
heed retreated from the civilian airframe market and concentrated its
efforts in the defense contracting area. Making a strong comeback in the
defense market, Lockheed emerged as the number one DoD contractor by the
end of fiscal 1962, with contract awards totaling over $1.7 billion. In
a November 1963 appearance before the New York Society of Security Ana-
lysts, Lockheed Chairman Gross outlined what he saw as the future of the
defense industry and the course he had set for Lockheed. He predicted a
period of solidifying the industry position in government contracting
through continued technological advancement while judiciously increasing
the non-defense portion of industry business through diversification and
internal product development. However, Mr. Gross also pointed out the
industry feeling that the aerospace firms possessed many unique skills
which were vital in meeting DoD needs and should be preserved as if they
were scarce assets.
By the end of 1963, Lockheed held a strong lead in defense contracting
13

holding contracts on the Air Force's primary heavy cargo transport, the
C-130 Hercules; the development and production of a new high-speed heavy
cargo transport, the C-141; and the research and development on the Navy's
Polaris missiles. As the coup of the period, Lockheed had sold the Navy
on the ill-starred Electra as a long range turbo-prop antisubmarine war-
fare aircraft, the P3A. In addition to these lucrative contracts, as
Lockheed moved into the 1964-1965 time frame, the company was confidently
working toward winning three more large scale government projects.
1. The projected $8 billion development and production
contract for the SST. Much of Lockheed's confidence
in this area stemmed from experience as the success-
ful developer of the U.S. /NATO supersonic F-104 inter-
ceptor and the only two Mach 2 production aircraft
then in existence — the Air Force's highly classified
YF-12 interceptor and the SR-71 spy plane.
2. A $1 billion plus development and production contract
for an Army compound helicopter advanced fire support
system (later to become the AH- 56 Cheyenne). By early
1964, Lockheed had already completed much of the pre-
liminary design work on this aircraft and was confi-
dent that final development and production could be
accomplished with a minimum of technical problems.
3. A $2 billion Air Force development and production
contract for a giant transport aircraft (C-5). Of the
three projects, this one appeared to be the easiest
for Lockheed to win. It was not expected to require
any technological advancements and was, thus, basic-
ally an "off-the-shelf" development. Lockheed's back-
ground in the existing C-130 and C-141 heavy transport
programs gave the company a decided advantage in the
competition for this contract.
Lockheed continued a strong financial recovery in the middle sixties.
While 1964 sales did drop from the $1.9 billion 1963 figure, net profits
rose from $43.2 million to $45.1 million. Exhibits I and II are compara-
tive financial statements for the period from 1962-1966. The subsequent
award of the C-5 and AH-56 contracts to Lockheed in early 1965 marked
the continued rise of the company's preeminence in defense contracting
and assured its retention of the top position on the DoD contractor list.
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These contracts, however, also marked the beginning of a new era in de-
fense procurement. Under the guidance of Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara, contracts were changed from the normal cost-plus type to a new
fixed-cost-plus-inventive-award concept. This new "total package pro-
curement" concept required the contractor to bid a single fixed price
for both development and follow-on production. He would be eligible to
receive incentive payments for early delivery and/or bettering contract
specifications on performance. The intent was to encourage contractors
to sharpen their engineering and bidding skills and thereby reduce over-
runs and discourage "buy-ins" - while also providing protection clauses
to cover increased contractor costs due to unforeseen economic conditions,
Moving into 1966 on the bow wave of DoD contracts, Lockheed saw the
rising demand for a high-capacity passenger transport as the opening for
the company to make a significant shift away from total dependence on
defense contracts and, at the same time, return to a position as a major
producer of commercial aircraft. In late 1966, while Boeing and Douglas
were working with only low-keyed design efforts, Lockheed was already
working on initial bid requests for engines, landing gear, and the auto-
matic flight control system. The time was rapidly approaching for a go-
ahead commitment to the program and, hoping to get an early lead over
competitors, the Lockheed development team was pushing for a final top
management decision by early 1967. The Lockheed "airbus" entry, the
L-1011, wa c a tempting route back into the commercial field. While the
company would have to fund this venture without the sizable progress pay-
ments it was use to with government contracts, funds were not expected
to be an overriding problem, even though a new production facility would
have to be constructed. Major subcontractors would be asked to work
under share-the-risk contracts, similar to those Boeing used in the 747
15

program, where their reimbursement would be delayed until the aircraft
were actually delivered. Additionally, although Lockheed had submitted
a "closely shaved" bid for the C-5 contract, it was expected that a later
repricing/renegotiation would ensure a positive cash flow to help support
the new commercial venture. Finally, the L-1011 team felt that early
entry into the project would give Lockheed most of the market in spite
of the fact that, except for the handful of Electras sold in the late
fifties, Lockheed had. not produced a commercial transport since the World
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III. LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION
A. L-1011 CASE B
Although no official announcement was made, the decision by Lockheed
management to pursue their version of the "airbus" venture, the L-1011,
was apparently made just prior to March 1967, when the company registered
a $125 million debenture issue to finance development operations.
Within three years, Lockheed Chairman Daniel Haughton found his com-
pany in serious financial trouble and was faced with the task of trying
to restructure Lockheed's position short of bankruptcy. Although Lock-
heed was involved in several profitable operations, government contracts
had encountered cost overruns totaling nearly $1 billion and were absorb-
ing the funds which normally would have been used to support the L-1011
program (which was now in serious danger of collapsing due to a shortage
of funds). Of the $400 million line of unsecured credit arranged to
finance L-1011 development, $320 million had already been drawn down and
the remaining $80 million was being held as a compensating balance. Out
of this $320 million, Lockheed had diverted over $170 million to cover
part of the cost overruns on the government contracts. A conservative
estimate indicated that sales of 250 L-lOlls would be required to reach
the breakeven point on the project, and, with orders stalled at 181 for
over a year, additional funds from new sales were not likely to be forth-
coming in the near future.
B. LOCKHEED OPERATIONS 1967-1970
The Spring of 1967 was an eventful period for the Lockheed Aircraft
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Corporation. In March, Board Chairman Courtlandt Gross retired after
some thirty-five years as a Lockheed executive. His successor, Daniel
J. Haughton, a veteran of twenty-eight years at Lockheed, inherited the
task of replacing the revenues, estimated at $2 billion a year, which
Lockheed had expected to receive from the SST project (the SST contract
had been awarded to Boeing). An immediate solution appeared to be
aggressive pursuit of the budding "airbus" market. Several factors made
Lockheed's entry into this field, the L-1011, a highly favorable project.
First, with several airlines showing a keen interest in an aircraft of
this type, Lockheed was far ahead of its competitors, Boeing and Douglas,
in being able to offer production and delivery of the L-1011. Boeing
had nearly all of its production facilities committed to either its com-
mercial transports (including the new 747 jumbo transport) or the newly
awarded SST project and was neither able nor desirous of committing itself
to another new development competition. Concurrently, Douglas had fallen
behind on deliveries of its DC-8 and DC-9 commercial transports and, fac-
ing a severe financial strain, had slowed development of its "airbus"
entry, the DC-10, to a token program while working out a merger agreement
with the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation. Second, as the price and sophis-
tication of military aircraft increased, the number purchased declined
and production runs shortened. Previously, production runs on military
aircraft had provided much stability in Lockheed's work force and flow of
revenues. More recently, with the commercial air travel boom, the over-
all industry trend showed production runs for commercial transports had
continued to lengthen and now exceeded military runs. Third, after loss
of the SST competition, the L-1011 was the only vehicle available through
which Lockheed had any prospect of reentering the civilian air transport
market. Lockheed's experience with the Air Force heavy transport programs
22

(C-130, C-141, and C-5) added to corporate confidence that L-1011 devel-
opment would not be too difficult.
Mr. Haughton's decision to go ahead with the L-1011 was almost imme-
diate, as Lockheed registered a $125 million debenture issue to finance
L-1011 development costs. He hoped to capitalize on the company's lead
over its competitors by working out final design details with potential
airline customers and obtaining sufficient orders to put the aircraft into
production before the end of the year. However, the two major prospects
for early orders, American Airlines and TWA, could not agree on several
critical design features. TWA wanted the aircraft to be powered by three
engines and have a transcontinental range, while American favored a two
engine design and a 1,850-mile range. This controversy, which was not
settled until August 1967, delayed Lockheed's formal presentation of spec-
ifications until September 1967. The delay allowed Douglas, rejuvenated
with new funds from its merger partner, to cut into Lockheed's early
development lead. Even after the September presentation, disagreement
•prevailed between the airlines and forced Lockheed to make major design
alterations to increase passenger capacity further. By the time final
specifications were submitted, Lockheed had virtually lost any lead it
held over McDonnell -Douglas. Additionally, in the rush to get early orders,
Lockheed had failed to design into the L-1011 the future growth potential
which would have allowed eventual evolution into an intercontinental ver-
sion.
As Lockheed moved into 1968, corporate optimism was buoyed by the
award of another major DoD development and production contract. After
much debate with the Army, Congress finally gave the go-ahead for pro-
curement of the AH-56 Cheyenne rigid-rotor helicopter. A temporary set-
back did occur in the L-1011 program in February, when American Airlines
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unexpectedly announced that it had chosen the McDonnell-Douglas DC-10
over the L-1011. Noting the marked similarity in design and performance
between the two aircraft, American cited the continuity of the Douglas
name in commercial jet transport production as a major factor in final
selection. Lockheed's reaction to the American/McDonnel-Douglas deal was
swift and initially effective. Arranging for major subcontractors, under
the risk-sharing plan, to amortize non-recurring costs over 350 aircraft
vice 250 as originally planned and increasing the number of units required
to break even, Lockheed lowered the L-1011 offering price from $17 million
to $15 million per aircraft. By early April, contracts had been arranged
with TWA, Eastern, Delta, Northeast, and Air Holdings, Ltd. of Britain
for sales of 172 L-lOlls. The very size of this transaction gave Lockheed
back a commanding lead in the "airbus" race and even threatened to dis-
rupt the American/McDonnell-Douglas agreement. Although McDonnell-Douglas
gained enough support through an additional contract with United Airlines
to justify a DC-10 production start-up, Lockheed had a firm lead in the
market going into 1969.
In mid-1969, Lockheed ran into trouble with some of its government
contracts. Congress had been investigating cost overruns on DoD contracts
and had turned up potential $1 billion overruns on both the C-5 and AH-56
contracts held by Lockheed. The Army became nervous and, citing the cost
overrun and'claiming failure to meet performance specifications, cancelled
the production portion of the AH-56 contract. The technical problems
encountered with the Cheyenne were not unusual or insurmountable and, in
more normal times, Lockheed would probably have been allowed to work them
out. However, with this contract cancellation, Lockheed found itself
faced with a significant loss on the program. The company had already
invested $100 million of its own funds, and the Army had asked for a
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repayment of $54 million in production prepayments. To compound the prob-
lem, as Congress continued to pressure DoD to cut cost overruns, the C-5
again came under fire. Bowing to this pressure in the form of fiscal con-
straints, the Air Force was forced, in November 1969, to cut the order
for C-5s from 120 to 81 aircraft. The effect of this action was devas-
tating. Lockheed had planned to develop a commercial version (L-500) of
the C-5 for introduction in 1975, as the military run was phased out.
The new cutback would close the production lines eighteen months early and
either force abandonment of the L-500 or necessitate its introduction at
an inopportune time when the airlines were still trying to absorb their
new jumbo and "a: rbus" fleets.
The projections for 1970 looked as dark for Lockheed as 1968 had
looked promising. While McDonnell-Douglas continued to receive orders for
the DC-10, only nine new L-1011 orders had been placed in almost two years
(the count stood at 102 firm and 79 option/follow-on L-1011 orders and an
estimated 102 firm and 99 option/follow-on DC-10 orders); and the airlines
were beginning to have difficulty arranging financing for purchases of
new equipment. Lockheed found that cash to continue operations was suddenly
a scarce commodity. The $400 million line of unsecured credit arranged to
finance the L-1011 was almost totally expended, the over $170 million
having actually been diverted to cover cost overruns on government contracts,
With the C-5 cutback, Lockheed's costs on this new program would exceed
the contract price by late 1970; and, without a new agreement, payments
from the government would cease. Only 31 aircraft would have been com-
pleted, and Lockheed was faced with funding the remainder of the 81-aircraft
production run out of corporate funds. Although Lockheed held other pro-
fitable government contracts, their combined revenues were not sufficient
to support the L-1011 program and still cover the three major DoD contract
cash drains of the following: 05

1. $124 million in disputed AH-56 claims.
2. $200 million in disputed shipbuilding claims.
3. $500-$600 million potential C-5 loss
These funding problems killed any hope of gaining relief from a possible
L-500 development. If the L-500 were designed to be highly compatible
with the C-5, the Air Force would have grounds to demand that Lockheed
share C-5 development costs. In order to fend off these Air Force demands,
the L-500 would have to be designed so that it would be only 20% compat-
ible with the C-5. This limitation would require an additional $250 mil-
lion in design and tooling costs to produce the L-500. As if these prob-
lems alone were not enough for a single corporation, the Securities and
Exchange Commission announced an investigation of top Lockheed officials
on charges that, using insider information, they had sold $1.1 million of
Lockheed stock just prior to public announcement of the C-5 cost overruns.
In- a desperate gamble to find support for his embattled company, Mr.
Haughton turned to Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard. In a March
1970 letter to Secretary Packard, Haughton had detailed the severe cash
problem facing Lockheed and stated that, without $576 million in assis-
tance over the coming three years, the company would be forced to suspend
production on key government contracts. Mr. Haughton felt the government's
response to his request was grossly inadequate and unfair. Secretary
Packard had offered Lockheed a settlement which, while it would make $200
million available for continued C-5 production, would require the company
to take a fixed loss of $200 million on the overall C-5 contract. As for
Lockheed's further L- 101 1 difficulties, in testimony before Congress,
Secretary Packard casually suggested that either receivership or a merger
was possibly the best solution.
While Mr. Haughton felt that Lockheed had a firm legal basis for a
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favorable court settlement of the C-5 controversy, one further obstacle
stood in the path leading from Lockheed's financial swamp. The consort-
ium of banks financing the L-1011 was not willing to renew and/or increase
Lockheed's line of credit while the government contract dispute was still
unsettled. Thus, lengthy litigation of the government claims could force
extended delays or even cancellation of the L-1011. Either of these un-
desirable alternatives would have further adverse impact on both customer
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IV. LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION
A. L-1011 CASE C
In May 1971, the Emergency Loan Guarantee Bill was introduced before
Congress and, in essence, carried with it the immediate future of the
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. As proposed, the Bill would provide Fed-
eral guarantees on loans of up to $250 million to qualified borrowers.
Although the legislation was written to have applicability for any busi-
ness deemed vital to the national economy, it was well understood that the
Act was specifically aimed at providing immediate assistance to the finan-
cially troubled Lockheed. Stiff opposition was expected in Congress,
where memory of the Penn Central Railroad bankruptcy the previous year
was still fresh. Time, however, was running out for Lockheed. The com-
pany was experiencing a severe cash shortage and was almost certain to
collapse without new funds. By an agreement just reached with DoD, Lock-
heed had accepted a fixed $200 million loss on the Air Force C-5 program;
and the L-1011 venture had stalled after the engine subcontractor, Rolls
Royce, had been taken over by the British government in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. Both the British government and Lockheed's U.S. bankers were
making further L-1011 funds contingent on the Federal loan guarantees.
Thus, the ball was passed to Congress.
B. CONGRESS LOOKS AT LOCKHEED
When Lockheed Chairman Daniel Haughton'appealed to Deputy Secretary
of Devense David Packard for financial help in March 1970, he opened the
door to public scrutiny of the company via Congressional hearings. Secre-
tary Packard's proposed $200 million contingency fund to ensure continued
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C-5 production had to be approved by Congress. These hearings provided
an open platform for DoD opponents, who delayed approval of the funds for
several months. Charges were made that the contingency fund was actually
aimed at saving Lockheed's financially troubled L-1011 commercial trans-
port, and calls Came for either government take-over of Lockheed's defense
projects or, at least, a forced change in the company's top management
personnel. Senator William Proxmire, chairman of the subcommittee on gov-
ernment economy, pushed for a full disclosure of Lockheed's cash flow
situation and firm guarantees that government funds would not be diverted
to any commercial venture. He countered Lockheed's contention that open-
ing the company's books for inspection would reveal confidential informa-
tion to competitors by pointing out that he was not asking for any more
information than a commercial banker would in a similar situation. As a
basis for his disclosure demand, Senator Proxmire cited Lockheed's cost
inflation of the undefined expense item "other" from an original C-5 con-
tract estimate of $72 million in 1965 to the current figure of $550 mil-
lion.
C. THE STALLED L-1011 PROGRAM
During the summer of 1970, while Lockheed was trying to negotiate a
settlement with the government on the C-5 dispute, the L-1011 program
appeared to be heading into a blind alley. After the initial surge of
"airbus" orders, demand from the airlines began to cool. The rate of
growth of U.S. carrier passenger traffic had started to show disturbing
trends. Although the total number of passengers rose in 1969 and 1970,
the rate of growth slowed in 1969, leveled off in 1970, and actually de-
clined in the first months of 1971. This reversal of the growth trend
occurred at the same time that the Boeing 747 was being placed into service.
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The downturn in business for the carriers was also accompanied by a tight-
ening of credit availability, and the airlines were finding it more dif-
ficult to obtain new financing for major equipment purchases. The tabu-
lation below shows the type, number, and load factor (percentage of capa-
city) for each jet aircraft used by U.S. carriers in 1969-1970. The slow-
down was more in evidence during the first half of 1971 when the overall
load factors dropped 2.4% for domestic flights and 4.3% for international












DC-8 251 252 47.2% 46.6%
707 417 493 48.3% 48.0%
720 128 107 51.3% 52.0%
727 595 625 52.6% 52.6%
DC-
9
314 325 51.5% 51.1%
737 128 134 50.1% 52.3%
880 41 41 54.3% 53.2%
The best market potential for additional airbus orders lay in the
requirement for an extended range international version. Here again,
Lockheed was handicapped. In a critical design mistake, Lockheed had
failed to make provisions for easily extending the TriStar's range with-
out major design alterations. The extended range TriStar (the L-1011-8)
would have only 40% parts compatibility with the basic L-1011 and would
require enlarging the wing by 20%, extending the fuselage, and adding
570,000 pounds to the gross take-off weight. In addition, Rolls Royce
would have to make major design changes to the RB.211 engine which, by
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some estimates, could cost Rolls Royce an added $200 million in develop-
ment expenses. This new airplane would sell for $17-$18 million each.
Conversely, Lockheed's closest competitor, McDonnell-Douglas, was offer-
ing an extended range DC-10-30 which required only minor modifications
from the basic DC-10 design (the aircraft's dimensions were unchanged,
but heavier structural components and more powerful engines added 120,000
pounds to the gross take-off weight) and was priced at about $16 million
each. As a result, while orders for the DC-10 and DC-10-30 continued to
be recorded, Lockheed's L-1011-8 "paper airplane" drew no response from
the airlines.
By September 1970, it appeared that Lockheed Chairman Haughton was
finally on the track to solving his cash shortage problem in the L-1011
program. He had persuaded Lockheed's bankers to exchange the $400 mil-
lion line of unsecured credit for a $500 million secured loan. The terms
of the loan provided $30 million immediately and held $150 million avail-
able in reserve, contingent upon settlement of the C-5 dispute with the
government (the new loan included $320 million already drawn on the old
credit lines). In addition, Haughton had also persuaded the major L-1011
buyers, TWA, Eastern, and Delta, to make an additional $100 million in
advance payments. These new funds would provide the badly needed cash to
keep the L-1011 in production while Lockheed settled its contract dis-
putes with the government.
Negotiations with DoD dragged on into 1971, with Mr. Haughton remain-
ing firm in refusal to accept Secretary Packard's settlement, which set a
$200 million fixed loss on the C-5 program for Lockheed. However, in
February, DoD threatened action which would essentially cut off further
funds for the C-5 project. Secretary Packard notified Lockheed that, if
the dispute had to be taken to court for settlement, the government could
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not make any payments in excess of the contract ceiling price until a
final court decision had been reached. Lockheed's delicate cash position
could not absorb the cut off of C-5 funds during a lengthy litigation pro-
cess, and Mr. Haughton was forced to accept the $200 million loss settle-
ment in order to keep the company alive.
D. THE ROLLS ROYCE BANKRUPTCY
Within a week of the C-5 settlement, Mr. Haughton came face-to-face
with two additional crises. First came the overwhelming news that Rolls
Royce was bankrupt. In an audit of Rolls Royce by an outside agency, it
was discovered that the original $156 million RB.211 project cost had
ballooned to $408 million and Rolls Royce stood to lose up to $500 mil-
lion in supplying L-1011 engines. The news of the Rolls Royce bankruptcy
was closely followed by an earthquake which rocked Lockheed's main plant
in Burbank, California. The collapse of Rolls Royce was totally unexpected
and left the L-1011 temporarily without an engine. Only three alterna-
tives were open to Lockheed. First, the TriStar program could be scrapped.
This proved to be the least desirable course of action because of the
tremendous adverse impact upon Lockheed, the customer airlines, and the
L-1011 subcontractors. Aside from the loss of several thousand jobs, an
estimated $1.4 billion investment would go down the drain (Lockheed -
$375 million, creditor banks - $400 million, airlines - $250 million,
and subcontractors - $350 million). As a second alternative, Lockheed
could redesign the TriStar for a different engine. Both Pratt and Whit-
ney and General Electric could supply an acceptable engine, but Lockheed
engineers estimated that the redesign effort necessary to modify the
L-1011 would cost at least $100 million and require a delay of up to six
months. The third and most attractive alternative centered on negotiation
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for a new engine contract with the British government, which had taken
over Rolls Royce operations, with the hope of keeping disruption of pro-
duction to a minimum.
Lockheed chose to stay with the Rolls Royce RB.211 and began working
with the British government, the L-1011 buyers, and Lockheed's creditor
banks to develop a mutually agreeable solution. For several days, a prob-
lem of trust hampered the discussions. The airlines wanted a positive
guarantee that the participating banks would not withdraw the promised
financial support. The banks wanted a positive guarantee that none of the
L-1011 purchasers would back out of their purchase agreements. The Brit-
ish government wanted guarantees that both the banks and the airlines
would not renege on any of the agreements. A potential new engine con-
tract was finally worked out by April 1971. The provisions stipulated
that the British government would continue to fund RB.211 development and
guarantee to provide maintenance and spares for at least twenty years.
Lockheed agreed to pay $260,000 more per engine, waive any penalty pay-
ments for the expected late delivery of engines, and accept somewhat
lower performance specifications. Although the British government was
ready to sign the new contract, it was joined by the banks in tacking on
one final stipulation. The U. S. Government v/ould have to provide a
guarantee of the additional money which the banks were to make available
to Lockheed (this new money would extend Lockheed's total loan liability
to $650 million). On May 13, amid a storm of controversy, the administra-
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